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ABSTRACT  
Learning from the past has been recognised as an effective means to manage future challenges. This is particularly true 
for ship safety management in the maritime industry as the records of historical safety-related failures are generally 
accompanied by the losses of human lives, damage to the environment and the ships. However, the current ³OHDUQLQJ´
practice is not rationalised to facilitate effective safety management both from design and operational points of view. By 
proposing a unique approach of ³learning from the past´, this paper elaborates on a formal methodology towards ship 
safety management so that future risk control decisions can be made in an objective, transparent, and well-informed 
manner. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The long standing history of PDQNLQG¶V civilisation 
represents a learning process of human beings to better 
appreciate and understand the universe. In the course of 
this process, significant effort has been devoted to learn 
from past experience and prepare for the upcoming 
challenges in diverse disciplines [1] [2] [3] [4]. This 
process is accelerated by the rapid advancement of 
computer technology in the past decades, e.g. database 
technology and high-performance computing. 
Particularly in recent years, the trend of recording 
historical operational records of specific domains and 
transforming them into pertinent business intelligence 
has become an increasingly important means for modern 
business to obtain an informational advantage [5] [6] [7] 
[8]. 
The maritime industry, playing a key role in the 
globalisation process, has also been deeply involved in 
collecting ship operational data with the aim to improve 
the operational performance. For instance, IHS is one of 
leading maritime data supplier in providing worldwide 
shipping-related information [9]. Moreover, as far as ship 
safety is concerned, operators are required to report and 
analyse their operational non-conformities and incidents 
in order to comply with the International Safety 
Management (ISM) code [10]. The latest adoption of the 
Casualty Investigation Code [11] at IMO, reached the 
culmination of the advocation of learning from the past. 
Despite these undertakings taking place originally at 
regulatory level, significant improvement has been 
achieved over the past decades, particularly in terms of 
the number of reported casualties worldwide [12]. 
Notwithstanding the above developments, the utilisation 
of the increasingly accumulated casualty data in a 
holistic and effective way has encountered various 
practical difficulties. As a result, at a global management 
level, such a learning practice can be best described as (i) 
rule-oriented, and (ii) case-specific. It is rule-oriented in 
a way that safety enhancement is sought through 
prescriptive legislation without clear goals and 
objectives. Potential revisions are carried forward within 
the regulatory framework itself, whilst the findings of 
root causes analyses hardly ever feed back to yards, 
operators, and designers directly. A similar situation has 
also been observed from an organisational perspective as 
the lessons learnt through the SMS compliance can be 
difficult to circulate within a wider maritime community. 
It is case-specific as experience gained in the past 
suggests that key changes of the existing maritime safety 
framework have been driven mainly by individual high-
profile accidents, whilst a large proportion of records are 
under-utilised and ignored. 
In this respect, the current state of affairs with regards to 
maritime casualty data is that there are very limited 
formatted variables LQ WKHGDWDEDVHVZKLOH WKH³JROG´ LV
still largely hidden in the descriptive text [9] [13]. As a 
result, the subsequent findings will be naturally restricted 
to descriptive recommendations with undetermined 
enhancements [14] and high-level trending charts [12] 
[15]. 
Furthermore, although it is possible to implement some 
of the sophisticated root cause analysis techniques, e.g. 
the spra\ GLDJUDP IURP /OR\G¶V 5HJLVWHU [16], the loss 
causation model from DNV Maritime Solutions [17], and 
the root cause analysis map from ABS [18], to identify a 
list of loopholes for each record in the casualty database, 
it is still practically difficult to justify the ensuing 
corrective actions in terms of quantifiable cost and 
benefits. 
Deriving from the aforementioned findings and on the 
basis of WKHSKLORVRSK\RI³OHDUQLQJ IURPWKHSDVW´, this 
paper aims to describe a formal methodology of ship 
safety management by deploying a new concept of 
maritime casualty database and advanced data analysis 
techniques.  A new concept for the development of 
maritime casualty databases is introduced in Section 2, 
followed by a brief description of pertinent data mining 
techniques to transform the data into probabilistic 
knowledge models in Section 3. Section 4 elaborates on 
the use of such models for risk management followed by 
a case study in Section 5, which demonstrates the  
applicability of the concept proposed. 
 
2.  A NEW CONCEPT OF MARITIME 
CASUALTY DATABASE 
2.1  APPROACH 
An effective safety management throughout the ship life-
cycle will be only achieved if its performance can be 
measured scientifically. Considering what constitutes 
ship safety, it is governed only by a handful of factors 
(undesirable events) which, when considered 
individually or in combination, define a limited set of 
scenarios, as illustrated in Figure 1. These factors 
represent major accident categories with calculable 
frequencies and consequences, which inherently control 
the life-cycle risk of a ship at sea. 
 
Figure 1: Sequence of Scenarios [19] 
,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKHWHUP³WRWDOULVN´RIDVKLSKDVEHHQput 
forward in [20]. The aim is to quantify the overall 
through-life safety level so that a tangible safety measure 
in risk lexicon can be readily employed for direct use in 
ship design and operation. As an example, in the case of 
passenger ships, a knowledge-intensive and safety-
critical ship type, investigations suggest that flooding- 
and fire-related scenarios comprise over 90% of the risk 
(regarding loss of life) and almost 100% of all the events 
leading to decisions to abandon the ship [21]. In this 
way, it becomes apparent that by addressing the two 
principal hazards, namely flooding (due to collision and 
grounding) and fire in a consistent manner, the total risk 
of a passenger ship can be estimated and managed. 
Considering what influences both the pre-casualty and 
post-casualty phases of principal hazards, as depicted in 
Figure 1, it is essential for the new database to contain 
key information of the following seven modules:  
x Vessel information: it aims to record the 
information about ship particulars that describing 
the key characteristics. This module should provide 
a throughout scan of the ship so that an overview 
can be gained and important information on ship 
parameters can be collected.  
x Voyage condition: historical tragedies suggest the 
environmental conditions play an important role for 
a fully-developed accident, hence, situation-specific 
variables (e.g. ship location, voyage phase, 
visibility, sea state, and wind speed) are included to 
describe the conditions of the surrounding 
environment. 
x Critical systems (Hull/Machinery/Equipment): as 
far as ship principal hazards are concerned, the 
failures of critical hull/machineries/equipments can 
be vital initiating events to their occurrence. In this 
respect, the critical systems the failure of which 
could potentially lead to the occurrence of the 
principal accidents are included, e.g. propulsion 
systems, hull structures, steering and navigational 
systems, and electrical systems. 
x Collision: for the prevention of collisions/contacts, 
great attention has been paid to the bridge design. 
This module distinguishes powered collisions and 
drifted collisions as the energy released from the 
two categories varies dramatically. Moreover, the 
sequence of a collision is broken into phases 
containing event detection, manoeuvre planning and 
manoeuvre execution.  
x Grounding: ship grounding shares notable 
similarities with the collision, where early detection 
plays a significant role on the prevention of its 
occurrence. Grounding is more sensitive to safety 
culture and practice of ship operators regarding 
route planning and updating.  
x Fire: the fire event module deals with the factors 
influencing various phases of a fully developed fire: 
ignition, containment, escalation, and evacuation. 
x Consequence: it is designed to capture 
consequencues to the passengers, crew, the 
environment and the ship herself. 
 
2.2  IDENTIFICATION OF DOMINANT 
VARIABLES  
In pursuit of the new maritime casualty database, the key 
element would be a list of parameters to be recorded for 
each of the aforementioned modules. Certainly it would 
be practically infeasible to record hundreds of thousands 
of elemental parameters that determine the exact safety 
level of a ship. Therefore, an alternative is needed. In the 
knowledge that the fundamental objective is to provide a 
transparent and well-informed platform for decision 
making, it will be much more efficient to focus on the 
dominant variables and achieve a fast approximation of 
the risk level with sufficient accuracy.  
A promising way is to rely on the latest understanding 
and up-to-date risk models, which take advantage of 
years or even decades of continuous effort and 
accumulation in understanding the underlying physical 
phenomena. Thus, an important assumption that can be 
made is that the variables included in the latest risk 
models, which are developed and refined through various 
research projects (HARDER, SAFEDOR, GOALDS, 
etc.) are sufficient to capture the key features of the main 
hazards of interest. 
In order to facilitate the process of dominant variables 
identification, a hierarchical decomposition approach is 
proposed to systematically break down the total risk and 
its constituent elements up to a stage where the physical 
parameters of significant importance to the safety 
performance can be identified.  In this way, the proposed 
database structure provides a much larger and necessary 
amount of data stored and analysed as formatted 
variables, following the decomposition of this 
information from the usually descriptive text of the 
current maritime databases, thus achieving the main 
objective for the provision of improved and enhanced 
maritime databases.  
To carry out this process, the emphasis is placed on the 
key risk contributors. For example, in the case of 
passenger ships, the total risk should be sought through 
analysing the principal hazards: collision, grounding and 
fire. Moreover, on the basis of the definition of the risk, 
its quantification of the concerning hazard can be 
estimated through the product of a number of 
probabilities defining critical scenarios and the ensuing 
societal consequences, as illustrated below [22]. ܴ௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ ൌ ௖ܲ௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ ൈ ௪ܲ௔௧௘௥ ?௜௡௚௥௘௦௦ȁ௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ൈ ௙ܲ௔௜௟௨௥௘ȁ௪௔௧௘௥ ?௜௡௚௥௘௦௦ȁ௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ൈ ܥ௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ ܴ௚௥௢௨௡ௗ ൌ ௚ܲ௥௢௨௡ௗ ൈ ௪ܲ௔௧௘௥ ?௜௡௚௥௘௦௦ȁ௚௥௢௨௡ௗൈ ௙ܲ௔௜௟௨௥௘ȁ௪௔௧௘௥ ?௜௡௚௥௘௦௦ȁ௚௥௢௨௡ௗൈ ܥ௚௥௢௨௡ௗ  
௙ܴ௜௥௘ ൌ ௜ܲ௚௡௜௧௜௢௡ ൈ ௚ܲ௥௢௪௧௛ȁ௜௚௡௜௧௜௢௡ൈ ௘ܲ௦௖௔௟௔௧௜௢௡ȁ௚௥௢௪௧௛ȁ௜௚௡௜௧௜௢௡ ൈ ܥ௙௜௥௘  
Each of the aforementioned risk elements (i.e. 
probabilities and consequences) can be further 
decomposed into various safety performance aspects. 
The identification of pertinent safety performance 
parameters should be considered from the point of view 
of estimating the effectiveness of various preventive and 
mitigative measures. Table 1 presents such a process for 
the cases of collision and grounding.  
Concerted effort in the past decades in understanding 
these safety performance parameters suggests that they 
are influenced by a limited and dedicated ship design and 
operational issues, which are governed by a handful of 
ship (design) and operational parameters. Table 2 further 
exhibits such correlations concerning fire safety. 
 
 
  
Table 1: Links between Risk Components and Safety Performance Parameters concerning Collisions and Groundings 
Risk components 
Safety performance 
parameters 
௖ܲ௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ ௚ܲ௥௢௨௡ௗ  Probability of collision/grounding 
Reliability of navigation 
Reliability of manoeuvrability 
௪ܲ௔௧௘௥ ?௜௡௚௥௘௦௦ȁ௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ ௪ܲ௔௧௘௥ ?௜௡௚௥௘௦௦ȁ௚௥௢௨௡ௗ Probability of water ingress due to collision/grounding Structural capacity (hull breach) 
௙ܲ௔௜௟௨௥௘ȁ௪௔௧௘௥ ?௜௡௚௥௘௦௦ȁ௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ ௙ܲ௔௜௟௨௥௘ȁ௪௔௧௘௥ ?௜௡௚௥௘௦௦ȁ௚௥௢௨௡ௗ 
Probability of failure 
(capsize/sinking/collapse) due 
to water ingress and 
collision/grounding 
Time to capsize/sink/collapse 
ܥ௖௢௟௟௜௦௜௢௡ ܥ௚௥௢௨௡ௗ  Severity of consequence 
Post-accident system 
availability 
Time required for 
abandonment 
 
 
Table 2: Links between Safety Performance Parameters and Detailed Design Issues for the Fire 
Safety performance parameters Design issues 
Space-specific ignition frequency Fire fuel load and layout 
Heat source and layout 
Reliability and effectiveness of detection 
system 
Detection system selection & layout 
Reliability and effectiveness of suppression 
system 
Suppression system selection & layout 
Time to reach untenable condition Fire load 
Ventilation system 
Boundary classes 
Post-accident system availability Shipboard system arrangement 
Time required for abandonment Escape route 
Internal layout 
LSA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 By doing so, the basic ship and operational parameters 
that play an important role in quantifying the 
aforementioned risk components can be identified, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. A unique advantage of such a 
structure is that the complexity of the problem under 
consideration can be greatly simplified as one can 
address a single design or operational issue at a time. 
Consequently, a new database platform containing the 
identified ship design and operational parameters can be 
developed for data collection. 
 
Figure 2: Links between Basic Parameters and Ship Total 
Risk 
 
3.  DATA PROCESSING 
The need for more sophisticated data analysis techniques 
is derived from the difficulties that classical regression 
analysis becomes inefficient to cope with a mathematical 
model containing more than a handful of variables at a 
time. The situation is exaggerated by the fact that 
physical casualty relevant parameters are often presented 
in discrete manner rather than continuous format (ship 
types, locations, onboard spaces, etc.). This has given 
rise to the use of data mining, which aims to transform a 
data set containing many variables into a meaningful and 
interpretable model through multivariate data analysis 
techniques. 
Due to the diversity of data mining techniques, the 
identification of the most adequate platform and the 
DVVRFLDWHG ³PLQLQJ´ WHFKQLTXHV Dre of great importance. 
In this respect, Bayesian networks (BNs) [23], offer a 
unique platform for fulfilling the intended goals. This is 
attributed to (i) their inherent capability for probability 
inference, (ii)  the transparency and the flexibility of 
presenting complex relationships, and (iii) to the 
foundation that has been laid in the maritime industry 
[24] [25]. 
A Bayesian Network is a tool capable of describing 
complex cause-and-effect relationships probabilistically 
by using intuitive visual representations. A generic 
Bayesian network model is comprised of a set of 
variables making up the nodes in the network, a set of 
directed links (with arrows) connecting the nodes and 
representing dependent relationships, and an array of 
probability density functions/conditional probability 
tables (CPT) associated with each node describing the 
probabilistic influence of its parents. The key feature of a 
Bayesian Network is the ability to form a risk-knowledge 
model that enables reasoning about the uncertainty of the 
situation it describes.  
Bayesian networks offer several advantages over 
conventional risk modelling techniques: 
x There is no need to assume independent 
relationships among events (as this is the case 
for the root events in a fault tree) as these can be 
described easily by directing arcs. 
x The intuitive visual presentation depicting 
causal relationships facilitates a reasonably 
realistic model that is logical, easy to understand 
and validate.   
x Different sources of information can be 
deployed concurrently for the population of 
CPTs in one model without conflict.  
x Bayesian networks can be easily updated locally 
with new information, without the need to 
recreate the whole structure of the network 
x The information entailed in a network is 
computed and propagated probabilistically, a 
feature which is consistent with the risk 
assessment paradigm. 
x The computations can be carried out using 
readily available tools, irrespective of the size 
and complexity of a model. 
x If the variables in the model are the key 
indicators/measures of a selected domain, the 
model would become a useful decision-support 
tool.  
Despite the increasing applications of Bayesian networks 
in the maritime industry, questions remained to be 
DQVZHUHG DUH EURXJKW IRUWK ³How to rationally identify 
Risk 
Safety performance parameters 
Ship 
parameters 
Operational 
issues 
Operational 
parameters 
Design 
issues 
Situation-specific 
parameters 
the complex causality relationships in the case of more 
than a few variables?´DQG³How to objectively quantify 
large conditional probability tables?´ 
In this respect, it is found that the applications also lead 
to mountainous research activities in identifying the 
influence relationships among the variables from 
observational records. Relevant learning techniques are 
developed so that a network can be constructed with 
minimal subjective intervention. Apart from eliciting the 
structure of a Bayesian network model from the data, 
formalised methods for populating the conditional 
probability tables have also been developed concerning 
the quantification of the network. With the detailed 
mathematical techniques described in [26], the following 
section briefly summarises the procedures to be 
followed. 
 
3.1 BAYESIAN STRUCTURE LEARNING 
The current approaches towards the learning of a 
network structure have been widely classified as: 
constraint-based learning and scoring-based learning, in 
which distinct principles are adopted.  
Constraint-based learning starts with the identification of 
dependent and conditional independent relationships 
among various variable combinations by using statistical 
measures. The traditional approach is to make null 
hypothesis testing of dependencies between two 
variables so as to identify the significance of an 
association which will be checked against a predefined 
confidence level. This approach is feasible in the case of 
two variables, but more advanced mathematical models 
are needed to identify conditional independent 
relationships among three or more variables. Under such 
circumstance, two mathematical models can be deployed 
for dependency analysis: logistic regression model and 
loglinear model.  
With a collection of independent and conditional 
independent relationships, the next step is to construct a 
Bayesian network skeleton that entails all the discovered 
relationships. This can be achieved by utilising proper 
learning algorithm. One of the most widely accepted 
approaches, known as PC algorithm [27], was selected 
for Bayesian network structure induction. The PC 
algorithm is briefly introduced here: 
x Start with a complete undirected graph in which 
each variable is linked with all other variables 
with undirected arcs. 
x Iterate throughout the graph to remove the link, 
say ሺ െ ሻ from the graph if there is ሺǡ ȁሻ, 
where  denotes any node of the set of adjacent 
nodes of  and . ሺǡ ȁሻ indicates that and  are conditionally independent given . 
x Iterate throughout the network with each 
uncoupled meeting ሺ െ  െ ሻ  and orient as ሺ ՜  ՚ ሻ  if   and   are found to be 
independent given a set of variables which do 
not contain . For the remaining links, the arrow 
VKRXOGEHGLUHFWHGLQDZD\WKDWQRPRUH³KHDG-
to-KHDG´OLQNZLOOEHFUHDWHG 
In contrast to the constraint-based learning, the scoring-
based learning focuses on the identification of a Bayesian 
network structure as an integral unit. The principle is to 
evaluate the superiorities of all possible network 
skeletons using dedicated criterion functions and to select 
the one receiving the highest score. This implies that two 
components have to be properly addressed: a scoring 
criterion and a searching algorithm. Various score 
functions has been developed for acting as the criterion, 
e.g. Bayesian scoring criterion [28], Bayesian 
information criterion [29], Akaike information criterion 
[30], Minimum Description Length [31]. To obtain the 
optimal BN model, a heuristic searching algorithm can 
be adopted for generating all promising network patterns 
for evaluation [32]. 
 
3.2 BAYESIAN PARAMETERS LEARNING 
The main objective of parameters learning is to quantify 
the obtained network skeleton with conditional 
probabilities, which will be derived purely on the basis of 
the collected data. This is achieved by assuming the 
various statuses of each parameter in the network are 
Dirichlet distributed [28]. In this way, the distribution 
function can be updated by additively taking into account 
of new evidence in the data. 
4. RISK MANAGEMENT  
Following the introduction of a new casualty database 
and the ensuing data mining techniques, it becomes 
straightforward to transform the collected maritime 
casualty data into probabilistic models which are 
materialised in the form of a Bayesian network. 
Nevertheless, it is important to ensure that the obtained 
models are intelligent enough for the purposes of the 
decision making process of safety management.  
On the other hand, it is appreciated that the core activity 
of safety management is to identify cost-effective risk 
control options. The measures should focus on reducing 
the frequency of occurrence of a hazard (preventive) or 
mitigating the ensuing consequences. A high level list of 
generic risk control options is illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Generic Risk Control Options 
Broad classification of the listed risk control options 
suggests that two types of variables influence the risk 
level of a specific design: design parameters and 
operational parameters. The design parameters refer to 
those parameters/features that can be controlled at the 
early design stage and determine the capability of a 
design to withstand/sustain accidents through preventive 
and/or mitigative means, e.g. installation of ECDIS 
system, watertight subdivisions, fire detection systems, 
suppression systems. In other words, there are parameters 
that are capable of leading to designs which are more 
tolerable to software and hardware failure and more 
resistive to catastrophic consequences following the 
initiation of an accident. On the other hand, the 
operational parameters are concerned with general 
practice and procedures to be followed during the ship 
operation stage for reducing the exposure to risky 
circumstances. For instance, scheduled maintenance, 
regular training of crews, establishment of contingency 
plan, etc., are all typical examples of operational means 
for safety assurance. 
It is noted that apart from design and operational 
parameters there are certain environmental variables that 
influence the risk level as well, such as traffic 
characteristics, geography, time of the day, sea state, etc. 
These parameters can be referred to situation-specific 
parameters as a combination of different statuses would 
evidently lead to a unique analysing situation.  
Deriving from the above, as the parameters recorded in 
the database focus mainly on the dominant influential 
design and operational factors and the timeline 
development of the hazards under consideration, it is 
important to realise that the subsequently obtained 
Bayesian network models can easily accommodate the 
sequential events that lead to the manifestation of a 
specific hazard. For instance, they contain the occurrence 
of an event, its escalation, and ultimately, the possible 
consequences. As the information is stored 
probabilistically, such a model can be regarded as a 
generic risk model for risk level estimation. From this 
point of view, a Bayesian network model is equivalent to 
a conventional risk contribution tree (i.e. fault tree, event 
tree) for risk assessment.   
On the other hand, with ship design, operational and 
situation-specific parameters recorded in the database 
and utilised for data processing, their influences on the 
scenario-defining variables in the aforementioned risk 
models can be established without much difficulty. In 
this case, the Bayesian network model can be regarded as 
a risk-knowledge model, where the knowledge of the 
interrelationships between manageable (physical) entities 
and the key risk components are stored and expressed 
probabilistically. In this way, the risk level of the 
interested hazard is ultimately conditional on the statuses 
of these three groups of parameters: ship design, 
operational, and situation-specific parameters. Figure 4 
exhibits conceptually such unique characteristics of 
Bayesian network models.  
 
 
Figure 4: A Conceptual Bayesian Network Model 
On the basis of the foregoing, it becomes apparent that 
through the methodology of employing the new database 
and pertinent data mining techniques, the obtained 
Bayesian network model can be used as a tool for risk 
level estimation. In the meantime, it also facilitates a fast 
evaluation of various risk control options for effective 
decision making. A unique advantage of such an 
approach is that decisions can be made on a transparent 
and objective basis. 
 
5. A CASE STUDY 
Ship 
parameters 
Operational 
parameters 
Occurrence Escalation Consequence
Risk models
Risk knowledge models
Situation-
specific 
parameters 
In pursuing a rational treatment of fire risk at the design 
stage, the proposed methodology will be demonstrated 
with a case study that starts with the identification of 
dominant variables, the database development, the BN 
model learning, the design of alternative scenario 
generation, and the decision-making on the basis of the 
whole process. The important variables are identified and 
listed as follows: 
x Date of event 
x Time of event 
x Vessel location 
x Weather contribution 
x Detection means 
x Suppression means 
x Ventilation system status 
x Fire door status 
x Space occupancy status 
x Crew status 
x Boundary cooling status 
x Emergency response failure 
x Containment failure 
x Ignition in adjacent space 
A significant amount of operational fire accident/incident 
data (covering a reporting period of 3-4 years) is used. 
The data set was imported into the BN by a learning 
program developed in statistical computing software R 
(http://www.r-project.org/). Both constraint-based and 
score-based learning algorithms have been examined 
together with the parameter learning. The resulting 
network model is shown in Figure 5. Initial result 
suggests a good agreement with the output from similar 
data mining tools. 
 
Figure 5: Constructed Bayesian Network Model 
(Constraint-Based Learning) 
For this specific case, the trained Bayesian network can 
be considered as a risk sub-model and a risk knowledge 
sub-model that is depicting certain phases of a fully 
developed fire event. With respect to the risk knowledge 
model, it includes design, operational, and situation-
specific parameters. The detailed classification is 
tabulated in Table 3.  
Table 3: Variables of the Developed BN Model 
Risk model  Variables 
 SOLAS space category 
Emergency response failure 
Containment failure 
Ignition in adjacent space 
Risk 
knowledge 
model 
Variables 
Ship parameters SOLAS space category 
Automatic detection 
Automatic suppression 
Ventilation status 
Operational 
parameter 
Manual detection 
Manual suppression 
Fire door status 
Crew attendance 
Guest attendance 
Ventilation status 
Boundary cooling 
Situation-
specific 
parameter 
Weather contribution 
Time of the day 
Ship location 
For illustration purposes, the obtained Bayesian network 
model is utilised for risk management at the operational 
stage. Nevertheless, its application can be easily 
extended to risk management during the design stage. 
A number of risk control solutions can be generated for 
protecting the accommodation spaces, with particular 
reference to crew and passenger cabins. Main attention is 
paid to the prevention of cabin fire and mitigation of the 
ensuing consequences. Table 4 exhibits three control 
options in addressing the hazards in question. 
Table 4: Risk Control Solutions (SOLAS Space Category 
7, Accommodation Space: Cabin) 
 Solution Explanation 
1 Improve 
patrolling 
Fire started at night is more likely to 
escalate and lead to more serious 
consequence as the response time for 
fire detection and fighting can be 
significantly delayed; improving 
patrolling would shorten such delay  
2 Invest in 
fireproof 
The collected historical fire incident 
data suggests that bin-related fire 
bins comprises 45% of all cabin fire; hence, 
by investing in fireproof bins to cut off 
the oxygen supply, it is expected to 
suffocate such fires at an early stage 
3 Crew 
awareness 
training 
The collected historical fire incident 
data suggests that fire started in crew 
cabins comprises more than 40% of all 
cabin fires; hence, by conducting fire 
awareness training, both fire 
prevention and mitigation performance 
can be improved  
In pursuing a rational process that enables a scientific 
treatment of every aspect of ship performance, a 
transparent and systematic decision support framework 
plays a vital role. Regarding this, the approach proposed 
in [33], was adopted, in which pair-wise comparisons of 
risk control options with respect to their economic, 
technical, and safety performance are conducted.  
For this specific case, the impact of various control 
options on the overall fire risk is linked through the 
YDULDEOHV³SOLAS space category LJQLWLRQIUHTXHQFLHV´
DQG ³manual detection´ DV VKRZQ LQ )LJXUH 6. To 
quantify the associated conditional probability tables, 
domain knowledge can be derived from pertinent 
historical data or dedicated mathematical models. For 
demonstration, it is assumed that ³VROXWLRQ ´ would 
have generally 20% improvement to the manual 
detection system in terms of the effectiveness of 
detecting fire LQFLGHQWV LQ FDELQ VSDFHV ³VROXWLRQ ´ LV
estimated to lower the fire ignition frequency by 10%, 
DQG ³VROXWLRQ ´ would improve the manual detection 
effectiveness by 10%. The ultimate influence can be 
observed through the node 
³Emergency_response_failure´DVLOOXVWUDWHGLQ7DEOH. 
 
Figure 6: Details of the Bayesian Network Model (Risk 
Control Solutions) 
Table 5: Results of the Bayesian Network Inference 
 ୣ ୫ୣ୰୥ୣ୬ୡ୷ ?୤ୟ୧୪୳୰ୣȁ୧୥୬୧୲୧୭୬ 
Solution 1 0.00306 
Solution 2 0.00264 
Solution 3 0.00299 
The subsequent pair-wise comparison with respect to 
safety performance is tabulated in Table 6, where the 
performance of risk control options is reflected through 
the estimated priorities. 
Table 6: Pair-Wise Comparisons  
 
S1 S2 S3 Priority 
S1 1 0.863 0.977 0.314 
S2 1.159 1 1.133 0.364 
S3 1.023 0.883 1 0.322 
Apart from safety performance, there is also a need to 
consider other aspects in measuring the merits of various 
alternatives. The most important indicators for this 
specific application are technical indicators, incurred cost 
and safety. Similar study can be carried out accordingly. 
Consequently, priorities can be synthesised with overall 
performance evaluated, as shown in Table 7. Weighting 
factors can be assigned as well to stress the importance 
of their safety orientation. Figure 7 further exhibits the 
performance of three risk control solutions in safety, 
technical and cost aspects. 
 
 
 
Table 7: Priority Synthesis (Emphasis on Safety)  
 
Safety Technical Cost Priority 
 
0.50 0.25 0.25  
S1 0.314 0.263 0.429 0.3301 
S2 0.364 0.389 0.214 0.3330 
S3 0.322 0.347 0.357 0.3369 
 
 Figure 7: Risk Control Solutions Evaluation Diagram 
(Sample) 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
A unique methodology towards safety management has 
been presented in this paper. This is achieved by 
following the philosophy of ³learning from the past, to 
manage the future risk´.  Main emphasis is placed on the 
development of new casualty database system, the 
subsequent model training and applications within the 
context of safety management. The resultant situation is 
an objective evaluation of various risk control options 
that facilitate the decision-making process both at the 
design and operation stages. This will contribute 
positively to the ultimate goal of effective safety 
management. 
Future development will focus on the development of an 
integrated risk management environment, in which the 
user interface for data input, relevant databases, data 
mining techniques, and graphic presentations of risk 
index would be accommodated.   
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